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I.

INTRODUCTION

Public policy favors testamentary bequests to charity. At least, that is the claim of
numerous courts and legislative bodies. The policy favoring charitable bequests may tip
the scales in deciding the proper interpretation of a will or the merits of an undue
influence, or incapacity claim. Paradoxically, courts and legislative bodies rarely discuss
the source of this public policy.1 Nor do they inquire into the wisdom of the policy.2 They
should.

In the coming years, we will see a staggering amount of money change hands as a
result of death—mainly thanks to the Baby Boomers.3 The Boomers will receive
inheritances of about $8.4 trillion from their own parents.4 In turn, the Boomers are
expected to leave $30 trillion to their own heirs.5 Death, it seems, is now an important
part of many financial plans. “Many boomers…have been lagging behind in their
savings, betting on—hoping for—big bequests, especially since many of them suffered

1

See, e.g., In re Stalp, 359 N.Y.S.2d 749, 753 (1974) (“It requires no extended discussion
of local (New York) law to establish that our public policy favors charitable giving.”); In
re Estate of Baum, 418 Pa. 404, FN 2 (1965) (“It is difficult to conceive of a
Commonwealth public policy that is more fundamental or more meaningful than its
frequently restated policy of encouragement to charities and charitable giving in the
public interest.”).
2
See id.
3
Baby boomers are “[m]embers of the large generation born from 1946 to 1964.” Baby
Boomers:
The
Gloomiest
Generation,
Pew
Research,
available
at
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2008/06/25/baby-boomers-the-gloomiest-generation/.
4
See METLIFE MATURE MARKETS INSTITUTE, THE METLIFE STUDY OF INHERITANCE AND
WEALTH TRANSFER TO BABY BOOMERS 2 (2010) [hereinafter METLIFE].
5
See ACCENTURE, THE “GREATER” WEALTH TRANSFER: CAPITALIZING ON THE
INTERGENERATIONAL SHIFT IN WEALTH 1 (2012) [hereinafter ACCENTURE].
3

big losses in 2008.”6 Whether they will actually receive those bequests is an entirely
different question. Some experts believe that increases in average life expectancy and the
associated costs will result in many Americans outliving their savings.7 But, there is
another, less obvious reason why would-be heirs should not count on receiving an
inheritance from their parents: charities and non-profit organizations. Heirs are not the
only ones banking on their parents’ deaths. Charities are also banking on the Baby
Boomer wealth transfer—predicting a “golden age of philanthropy.”8 Unlike the typical
heir, however, charities are in the business of soliciting gratuitous transfers—often quite
aggressively. The potential for conflict between would-be heirs and charities should be
obvious, yet little scholarship considers the issue.

The public policy favoring testamentary bequests to charities is well established
in the law. However, that public policy can and does conflict with other equally wellfounded public policies. When confronted with this conflict, courts are often dismissive
or even hostile towards the parties seeking to challenge a testamentary bequest to a
charity. I argue that the policy favoring charitable giving has gone too far and has, in

6

Anne Tergesen, Counting on an Inheritance? Count Again. WALL ST. J., June 11, 2012,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303990604577370001234970954.html.
See also, Steve Ronsen, Kids and Money: If You Plan to Leave and Inheritance, Manage
Expectations, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 14, 2013, available at
http://www.sacbee.com/2013/10/14/5819662/kids-and-money-if-you-plan-to.html
7
Tergesen, supra note 5.
8
Richard C. Morais, Huge Wave in Charitable Giving Still Coming, FORBES, October 2,
2009, available at http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/02/estate-tax-bill-gates-bostoncollege-personal-finance-bc.html.; See also Julia Love, These Days, Colleges Urge
Young Alumni to Give…Posthumously, 58 CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Issue 42,
at A20 (Aug. 3, 2012).
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some instances, undermined other important public policies. Specifically, courts and
legislators have strengthened the charitable bequest policy without giving enough
consideration to other, equally important public policies. This problem is not new.
History shows that similar policy conflicts have arisen periodically since late antiquity—
if not earlier. The parameters of the problem, however, are somewhat new. The
governing law, available technologies, and familial relationships have certainly evolved
since the time of late antiquity. This article examines how the public policy favoring
charitable bequests conflicts with various aspects of the equally important public policies
of testamentary freedom and family protection.

Part II considers the competing public policies of testamentary freedom, family
protection, and charitable bequests as well as the existing legal doctrines aimed at
furthering these policies. Part III examines the social and legal origins of charitable
bequests and the periodic attempts to balance charitable bequests with other important
policy considerations. Part IV examines the role of the non-profit sector in America
today. Specifically, Part IV considers the size and scope of the nonprofit industry, the
legal and economic benefits the nonprofit industry enjoys, and the manner in which
nonprofits solicit charitable bequests. Part V illustrates how the current law fails to strike
the appropriate balance between the competing policies. The current law is too favorable
to charities and reform is needed. Part VI concludes.

II.

COMPETING PUBLIC POLICIES

5

American law favors charitable giving, testamentary freedom, and family protection
as matters of public policy. For thousands of years Western society has struggled to strike
the appropriate balance between these competing concerns. Today, a number of laws and
doctrines promote and protect these public policy concerns.
A. Freedom of Testation.
In every American jurisdiction, “[t]he first principle in the law of wills is freedom
of testation.”9 At its core, testamentary freedom means that a “testator may dispose of his
property as he pleases, and that he may indulge his prejudice against his relations and in
favor of strangers, and that, if he does so, it is no objection to his will.”10 Looking to state
statutes and centuries of jurisprudence, numerous courts have described freedom of
testation as a matter of public policy.11 A variety of laws and doctrines protect this
fundamental organizing principal. For example, in order to exercise testamentary rights,
the testator must (1) possess testamentary capacity at the time he executes the
testament,12 and (2) execute the testament in compliance with the form prescribed by law.
Although the nuances of these requirements vary by state, the object of both is to
safeguard, among other things, testamentary freedom.

9

John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489,
491 (1975).
10
Breeden v. Stone, 992 P. 2d 1167, 1170 (Colo. 2000).
11
See, e.g., In re Estate of Feinberg, 235 Ill. 2d 256, 265 (2009) (“[O]ur statutes clearly
reveal a public policy in support of testamentary freedom.”); U.S. Nat. Bank of Portland
v. Snodgrass, 275 P. 2d 860, 866 (Or. 1954) (en banc) (“[W]e submit that taken together
they reveal a long-accepted pattern of public attitude and public policy in this state
respecting an almost unrestricted right to dispose of one’s property on death.”); Monroe
v. Barclay, 17 Ohio St. 302, 316 (1867) (“[I]t is the policy of the law to secure to every
one the right to dispose of his property in accordance with his individual will.”).
12
See, e.g., Dean v. Jordan, 194 79 P. 2d 331, 335 (Wash. 1938).
6

Three interrelated concepts aimed at ensuring freedom of testation are important
for our purposes: (1) the doctrine of undue influence; (2) the prohibition on a beneficiary
of a testament from serving as a witness or assisting in the preparation of the testament;
and (3) related attorney ethics rules.
1. Undue Influence.

To ensure that the decedent’s testament represents the true expression of his will,
his testament may be set aside if it was procured through fraud, duress, or, most
commonly, undue influence.13 Although the undue influence doctrine and the related
evidentiary issues vary from state-to-state, the essential thrust of the doctrine is to ensure
freedom of testation. Undue influence invalidates a testament executed in proper form by
a person possessing testamentary capacity because the “testator’s free will is destroyed
and, as a result, the testator does something contrary to his ‘true’ desires.”14 Not all
influence is undue.15 To be “undue” the influence must actually overcome the free agency
of the testator.16 The influence must have “so impaired the volition of the donor as to
substitute the volition of the donee or other person for the volition of the donor.”17 In
contrast, “legitimate influence” such as “influence obtained by kindness and affection” is

13

See, e.g., ATKINSON, supra note ___ at §54-61.
In re Rotax’s Estate, 429 A. 2d 1304, 1305 (Vt. 1981).
15
See In re Estate of Haneberg, 14 P. 3d 1088, 1096 (Kan. 2000).
16
See In re Estate of Maheras, 897 P. 2d 268, 273-74 (Okla. 1995); WILL CONTESTS,
supra note 12, at §7:2.
17
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1479 (West 2013).
14

7

not undue.18 The line between acceptable influence and undue influence is frustratingly
difficult to ascertain in some cases and has been criticized by a number of scholars.

To succeed on an undue influence claim, most jurisdictions require the presence
of four factors, namely: susceptibility, opportunity, disposition, and coveted result.19
Susceptibility refers to “a person who is susceptible of being unduly influenced by the
person charged with exercising undue influence.”20 The testator’s physical and mental
conditions are relevant in determining his susceptibility to influence.21 Often, this means
the testator had some diminished physical or mental capacity—yet he was not so
diminished as to actually lack testamentary capacity. In practice, the line between undue
influence and lack of capacity is not always clear. Facts giving rise to an undue influence
claim will typically support a lack of capacity argument as well. As a result, both
challenges are often brought together.22 Opportunity refers to “the opportunity of the
person charged to exercise such influence on the susceptible person to procure the
improper favor.”23 Disposition means “a disposition on the part of the party charged to
influence unduly such susceptible person for the purpose of procuring an improper favor
either for himself or another.”24 Finally, a coveted result is “a result caused by, or the

18

See In re Estate of Haneberg, 14 P. 3d 1088, 1096 (Kan. 2000).
See WILL CONTESTS, supra note 12, at §7:2.
20
Estate of Christen, 239 N.W. 2d 528, 531 (Wis. 1976).
21
WILL CONTESTS, supra note 12, at §7:3.
22
See Sherman, supra note __, at 619-20.
23
Estate of Christen, 239 N.W. 2d 528, 531 (Wis. 1976).
24
Id.
19

8

effect of, such undue influence.”25 The failure of the testator to provide for “the natural
objects of the testator’s bounty” is often evidence of a coveted result.26

In evaluating these factors, courts also consider whether the testator and the
alleged influencer had a confidential relationship.27 The existence of a confidential
relationship makes a finding of undue influence more likely. Some jurisdictions require a
confidential relationship as a threshold issue in all undue influence cases.28 In the
jurisdictions that do not explicitly require a confidential relationship as threshold issue,
findings of undue influence in the absence of a confidential relationship are unusual.29
Regardless of the specific approach taken by any individual jurisdiction, the existence or
non-existence of a confidential relationship is a critical determination in all undue
influence cases.

One of the more challenging aspects of undue influence cases is deciding which
relationships constitute confidential relationships. Generally, a confidential relationship is
a “relationship of inequality” meaning “a relationship in which the testator reposes an
exceptional degree of reliance on the integrity and loyalty of another, either because of
that other person’s knowledge or status or because of the testator’s dependence or
subservience.”30 Most jurisdictions agree that traditional fiduciary relationships—like the

25

Id.
Sherman, supra note __, at 619.
27
WILL CONTESTS, supra note __, at §7:4.
28
See, e.g., In re Estate of Haneberg, 14 P. 3d 1088, 1096 (Kan. 2000); Estate of
Gersbach, 960 P. 2d 811, 814 (N.M. 1998).
29
WILL CONTESTS, supra note __, at §7:4.
30
Sherman, supra note __, at 624.
26

9

attorney-client relationship or the relationship between the holder of a power of attorney
and the grantor31—may give rise to a relationship of confidence.32 Some jurisdictions go
so far as to call fiduciary relationships “confidential per se.”33 Confidential relationships,
however, include more types of relationships than legally recognized fiduciary
relationships. Whether a relationship constitutes a confidential relationship is a question
of fact, generally requiring proof that the relationship was either (1) a reliant relationship
or (2) a dominant-subservient relationship.34 A variety of relationships may form the
basis of confidential relationships if those additional facts are present. Courts have found
the following relationships, when coupled with evidence of a reliant or dominantsubservient aspect, to be confidential relationships: “a close confidential friendship,”35 “a
clergyman-parishioner relationship,”36 a caregiver relationship37, and a banker-customer
relationship.38

2. Interested Parties

The second doctrine aimed at ensuring freedom of testation prohibits an interested
party serving as a witness to the will or assisting in its preparation.39 This rule “seeks to
31

Medlock v. Mitchell, 234 S.W. 3d 901, 905 (Ark. App. 2006); Blissard v. White, 515
So. 2d 1196, 1199-1200 (Miss. 1987).
32
See WILL CONTESTS, supra note __, at §7:4; Sherman, supra note __, at 624.
33
See, e.g.. Kelley v. Johns, 96 S.W. 3d 189, 197 (Ct. App. Tenn. 2002).
34
See, e.g., Sherman, supra note __, at 624-25.
35
Estate of Brevard, 213 S.W.3d 298, 304 (2007).
36
Estate of Brevard, 213 S.W.3d 298, 304 (2007).
37
Bean v. Wilson, 661 S.E. 2d 518, 519 (Ga. 2008).
38
Owens v. Mazzei, 847 A. 2d 700 (Pa. Superior Ct. 2004)
39
See, e.g., Triestman v. Kilgore, 838 S.W. 2d 547, 547 (Tex. 1992) (“A competent
witness to a will is one who receives no pecuniary benefit under its terms.”)
10

insure that testators act free of influence from subscribing witnesses.”40 The existence of
an interested witness or the involvement of an interested person in the preparation of a
testament typically supports a finding of undue influence.41 Similarly, the involvement of
interested parties tends to prove that the will was executed under suspicious
circumstances. The scope and effect of the rule varies. A few states automatically void
any bequest to a subscribing witness or notary.42 The more common approach, in
contrast, allows the bequest to stand if there are additional disinterested witnesses.43 At
least two states do not invalidate the bequest, but by statute provide that the existence of
an interested witness creates a presumption of undue influence.44 Those states that do
prohibit bequests to interested witnesses typically seek to strike a balance between
testamentary freedom and family protection. To prevent a family member from being
disinherited simply because he witnessed the will, many states will still allow the
interested witness to receive an intestate or other share of property.45 Another issue of
some variation is the scope of persons subject to the rule. Some states apply their rule to
both interested witnesses and the spouses of interested parties by invalidating bequests to
40

Estate of Tkachuck, 139 Cal. Rptr. 55, 58 (Ct. App. 1977). See also In re Johnson’s
Estate, 347 So. 2d 785, 787 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1977) “An obvious purpose [of this rule],
was to prevent fraud or undue influence by a witness to a will to thwart the intention of
the testatrix.” Id.
41
See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §6112
42
See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1582; R.I. GEN. LAWS §33-6-1; W. VA. CODE §41-2-1.
43
See ARK. CODE §28-25-102 (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. §45a-258 (2013); TEX. PROB.
CODE §61-62 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. §30-2330 (2013); N. H. REV. STAT. §551:3 (2013);
N. Y. ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW §3-3.2 (2013); S. C. CODE §62-2-504 (2013);
TENN. CODE §32-1-103 (2013); WIS. STAT. §853.07 (2013); WYO. STAT. §2-6-112 (2013)
44
See CAL. PROB. CODE §6112 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE §11.12.160 (2013)
45
See ARK. CODE §28-25-102 (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. §45A-258 (2013); LA. CIV.
CODE art. 1582 (2013); MISS. STATS. §474.330 (2013), NEB. REV. STAT. §30-2330 (2013);
N. Y. ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW §3-3.2 (2013); S.C. CODE §62-2-504 (2013);
TENN. CODE §32-1-103 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE §11.12.160 (2013); W. VA. CODE §412-1 (2013); WIS. STAT. §853.07 (2013); WYO. STAT. §2-6-112 (2013).
11

the spouse of a witness.46 In contrast, a number of states expressly allow bequests to
charities with which a witness is associated.47 Some states also expressly allow a creditor
to serve as a witness.48

3. Attorney Ethics Rules.

A number of attorney ethics rules are also aimed at preventing attorneys from
negatively affecting a client’s exercise of his testamentary freedom. Model Rule 1.8(c)
prevents attorneys from preparing wills in which they receive large gifts and from
soliciting testamentary gifts from clients.

A lawyer shall not solicit any substantial gift from a client, including a
testamentary gift, or prepare on behalf of a client an instrument giving the lawyer or a
person related to the lawyer any substantial gift unless the lawyer or other recipient of
the gift is related to the client. For purposes of this paragraph, related persons include
a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent or other relative or individual with
whom the lawyer or the client maintains a close, familial relationship.49

46

CONN. GEN. STAT. §45a-258 (2013); LA. CIV. Code art. 1582.1 (2013); N.H. REV.
STAT. §551:3 (2013); S.C. CODE §62-2-504 (2013); W. VA. CODE §41-2-1 (2013); WIS.
STAT. §853.07 (2013).
47
See CONN. GEN. STAT. §45a-258 (2013).
48
See R. I. GEN. LAWS §33-6-2 (2013); W. VA. CODE §41-2-2 (2013).
49
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.8.
12

The rule imposes a duty on attorneys, for the benefit of their clients and the profession, to
refrain from engaging in any conduct that could raise an inference of undue influence.50
“An attorney must be as careful to avoid the appearance of evil as he is to avoid evil
itself.”51 To that end, paragraph (k) of Rule 1.8 goes further and imputes the conflict to
all other lawyers in the associated firm.52 In interpreting this rule, some states have
suggested it also applies to serving as a witness to a will.53

Paragraph (f) of Rule 1.8 is similarly aimed at protecting the client from undue
influence. Rule 1.8(f) prohibits an attorney from accepting payment for his services from
someone other than his client unless “(1) the client gives informed consent; (2) there is no
interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or with the clientlawyer relationship; and (3) information relating to representation of a client is protected
as required by Rule 1.6.”54 In the estate-planning context, this rule is intended to prevent
undue influence.55 When an attorney is paid by a client’s testamentary-heir, the court and
the public might fairly question whether the attorney’s loyalty and independence have
been affected.56

50

See, e.g., Att’y Grievance Com’n of Maryland v. Lanocha, 896 A. 2d 996, 998 (Ct.
App. Md. 2006); State v. Eisenberg, 138 N.W. 2d 235, 237 (Wis. 1965).
51
State v. Gulbankian, 196 N.W. 2d 730, 732 (Wis. 1972).
52
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.8.
53
See, e.g., People v. Berge, 620 P. 2d 23, 27 (Colo. 1980) (en banc)
54
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.8. Rule 1.6 addresses the duty of the
attorney to maintain the client’s confidentiality.
55
See Haynes v. First Nat. State Bank of New Jersey, 432 A. 2d 890, 889-90 (NJ 1981).
56
See Haynes v. First Nat. State Bank of New Jersey, 432 A. 2d 890, 889-90 (NJ 1981);
ABA Formal Op. 02-428.
13

B. Family Protection.

The public policy supporting family protection also permeates the law of wills. The
policy imposes a legal and moral duty on family members to support one another
financially. Familial support obligations have ancient roots and essentially recognize that
families form an economic unit.57 In the law of wills, several doctrines protect immediate
family members from disinheritance by a testator.
1. Spousal Share Statutes
Perhaps the most significant family protection mechanism is the inability of a testator
to fully disinherit his surviving spouse.58 With the exceptions of most59 of the community
property jurisdictions (in which spousal protection is assured through the community
property laws), and Georgia60, all states have elective share statutes that prevent the
testator from fully disinheriting his surviving spouse.61 In most jurisdictions “[t]his
probate doctrine allows a spouse to take a legislatively prescribed portion of the decedent
57

See Andrew Simmonds, Amah and Eved and the Origin of Legal Rights, 46 S.D. L.
REV. 516, 528 (2000-2001); John Whitte, Jr., The Goods and Goals of Marriage, 76
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1019, 1020-28 (2001).
58
See, e.g., Terry L. Turnipseed, Why Shouldn’t I Be Allowed to Leave My Property to
Whomever I Choose (Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Loving the French),
44 BRANDEIS L. J. 737, 781-82 (2006); Mark Glover, Formal Execution and Informal
Revocation: Manifestations of Probate’s Family Protection Policy, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 411, 415-17 (2009).
59
Louisiana, a community property state, also has an elective share statute. See LA. CIV.
CODE art. 2432.
60
GA. CODE §53-4-1 provides “A testator, by will, may make any disposition of property
that is not inconsistent with the laws or contrary to the public policy of the state and may
give all the property to strangers, to the exclusion of the testator’s spouse and
descendants.”
61
See, e.g., Glover, supra note __, at 416-17; Kenneth Rampino, Comment, Spousal
Disinheritance in Rhode Island: Barrett v. Barrett and the (De)Evolution of the Elective
Share Law, 12 RODGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 420, 450 (2007).
14

spouse’s estate regardless of the terms of the will.”62 Spousal share statutes are based two
theories of marriage: the “partnership theory” and the “support theory.”63 “The
partnership theory of marriage recognizes that both partners have contributed to the
accumulated estate” and should, therefore, share in its benefits.64 Like community
property, the partnership theory of marriage recognizes that both spouses work together
and should share in the “fruits of the marriage.”65 In contrast, “[t]he support theory
recognizes that during their joint lives, spouses owe each other duties of support, and
these duties continue in some force after death in favor of the survivor, as a claim on the
decedent spouse’s estate.”66 If a testator fails to provide for his spouse by will, then the
support theory provides the surviving spouse with a claim against his estate for financial
support.67 The support theory seeks to prevent the surviving spouse “from becoming
society’s ward by preventing impoverishment of the surviving spouse.”68 Approaches, of
course, vary by state and may reflect one69 or both70 theories of marriage.

62

Glover, supra note __, at 416.
See e.g. In re Estate of Hjersted, 135 P. 3d 202, 207 (Kan. App. 2006)
64
In re Antonopoulos, 993 P. 2d 637, 642 (Kan. 1999). Accord, In re Amundson, 621,
N.W. 2d 882, 886 (S.D. 2001)
65
In re Antonopoulos, 993 P. 2d 637, 642 (Kan. 1999).
66
In re Antonopoulos, 993 P. 2d 637, 642 (Kan. 1999). Accord In re Estate of Shipman,
832 N.W. 2d 335, 342-43 (S.D. 2013)
67
Id.
68
Williams v. Williams, 517 S.E. 2d 689, 691 (S.C. 1999). Accord Karsenty v.
Schoukroun, 959 A. 2d 1147, 1167 (Md. Ct. App. 2008) (“…states responded by passing
elective share statutes to protect widows from being disinherited and left with no
reasonable means of financial support.”); In re Merkel’s Estate, 618 P.2d 872, 876 (Mont.
1980)(“The primary purpose of the elective share statutes is to insure that the surviving
spouse’s needs are met, and that the spouse is not left penniless.”).
69
See e.g. In re Estate of Bilse, 746 A. 2d 1090, 1092 (N.J. Superior Ct. 1999)(holding
that the New Jersey statute is need based); In re Estate of Shipman, 832 N.W. 2d 335,
342-43 (S.D. 2013)(holding that South Dakota statute is intended to satisfy spousal
support duty)
63
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2. Homestead Statutes
In addition to elective share statutes, a number of jurisdictions have homestead
statutes or constitutional provisions that protect the economic interest of the surviving
spouse and/or the children of the decedent. Broadly, there are two types of homestead
statutes: family home statutes and fixed sum statutes. Family home statutes protect the
interest of a surviving spouse and children in the family home. “As a matter of public
policy, the purpose of [these statutes] is to promote the stability and welfare of the state
by securing to the householder a home, so that the homeowner and his or her heirs may
live beyond the reach of financial misfortune and the demands of creditors…”71 The
family home statutes, therefore, recognize the significant emotional and economic
interests a decedent’s spouse and children have in the family home.72 A number of the
family home-type homestead statutes allow the surviving spouse and/or minor children to
remain in the family home even if the testator leaves the home to some other person.73
The property rights conferred by this right, and their duration, vary by state.74 Homestead
statutes further protect the surviving spouse and children by exempting the family home
from seizure and sale by creditors.75
The fixed sum-type homestead statutes, in contrast, give the surviving spouse and
dependent children a claim to a fixed sum of money from the decedent’s estate rather
70

See e.g. In re Amundson, 621 N.W. 2d 882, 886 (S.D. 2001) (“Two rationales underlie
our elective share system: support and contribution.”)
71
Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Lopez, 531 So. 2d 946, 947 (Fla. 1988)
72
In re Estate of Bonde, 694 N.W. 2d 74, 77 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005)
73
See e.g. MINN. STAT. §524.2-402; N.D. CENTURY CODE §30-16-02; 58 OKL. STAT.
§311; TEX. ESTATES CODE §102.005. See also, Snyder v. Davis, 699 So. 2d 999, 1001-02
(Fla. 1997).
74
See id.
75
See e.g. MINN. STAT. §524.2-402(c); Snyder v. Davis, 699 So. 2d 999, 1001-02 (Fla.
1997); Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Lopez, 531 So. 2d 946, 947 (Fla. 1988)
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than rights to real estate.76 The sum of money is ordinarily fixed by statute and is quite
modest.77 The policy considerations behind the fixed sum statutes are similar to the
family home statutes.78 To that end, the sum of money that the surviving spouse and
children receive under the applicable homestead statute is usually exempt from the claims
of the decedent’s creditors.79
3. Family Allowance Statutes
Family allowance statutes offer the testator’s surviving spouse and minor children
some additional protections. These statutes generally give the surviving spouse and minor
children the right to receive a time-limited allowance for their support during the
administration of the testator’s estate.80 “[T]he family allowance [is] a statutory creation
designed to provide sustenance for the family during the settlement of the estate…”81
Most family allowance statutes limit the time period of the support to one year.82 Unlike
other family protection mechanisms, family allowances typically fall within the
discretion of the courts.83 In determining whether a spouse or child is entitled to an
allowance, courts consider a variety of factors to determine need, including: age, health,
previous standard of living, value of the estate, and the value of other resources available
76

See e.g. MONT. CODE §72-2-412 ($20,000)
See e.g. ALA. CODE §43-8-110 ($6,000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §14-2402 ($18,000); IDAHO
CODE §15-2-402 ($50,000); MONT. CODE §72-2-412 ($20,000); MISSOURI STAT. §474.290
($15,000)
78
See Carter v. Coxwell, 479 So. 2d 1181, 1183 (Ala. 1985)
79
See note __, supra.
80
See e.g. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §14-2404; CAL. PROB. CODE §6540; MICH. COMP. L.
§700.2403; MISSOURI STAT. §474.260; MONT. CODE §72-2-414; 18 MAINE REV. STAT. §2403; MASS. GEN. L. 190B §2-404; UTAH CODE §75-2-404
81
In re Estate of Seymour, 671 N.W. 2d 109, 113 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003). Accord Parson
v. Parson, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 686, 687 (Ct. App. 1996)
82
See note __, supra.
83
See note __, supra. See also Estate of Hamilton, 869 P. 2d 971, 978 (Utah Ct. App.
1994); Estate of Butler, 607 P. 2d 956, 959 (Ariz. 1980)
77
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to the claimant.84 If a court does decide to award a family allowance, the payment is
typically made in priority to other debts.85
4. Undue Influence as Family Protection
Courts sometimes use the doctrine of undue influence to invalidate testaments that
fail to provide for the testator’s immediate family. Thus, undue influence operates to
ensure freedom of testation and, in some instances, family protection. Professor Melanie
Leslie examined a number of undue influence cases and observed:

Although the opinions studied habitually recited that a court’s sole purpose is to
effectuate the testator’s true intentions, a closer inspection reveals that a significant
number of courts employed a governing rule less concerned with divining
testamentary intent than with determining whether the reason behind the disposition
was justifiable in the court’s view. Courts were much more likely to honor
testamentary intent when the will provided for family members as opposed to nonrelatives.86

Several aspects of the undue influence doctrine facilitate courts in protecting the
testator’s family. If a court invalidates a testament on undue influence grounds, then the
decedent’s property will generally pass under the laws of intestacy—which will benefit

84

Estate of Hamilton, 869 P. 2d 971, 978 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); MISSOURI STAT.
§474.260
85
See Parson v. Parson, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 686, 687 (Ct. App. 1996)
86
Leslie, supra note ____, at 243-44.
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his surviving spouse and immediate relatives.87 Two important aspects of the undue
influence doctrine are easily seen as family protection mechanisms: the confidential
relationship requirement and the coveted result/unnatural bequest requirement.

The existence of a confidential relationship between the testator and the influencer is
a threshold issue in most undue influence cases.88 Family members benefit from this
requirement because courts are hesitant to find family members in a confidential
relationship with each other—thus, it is less likely for a testament to be invalidated due to
the influence of a close relative. Courts struggle to fit family relationships into the
confidential relationship framework—particularly spousal relationships and parent-child
relationships. In practice, “[c]ourts are reluctant to find a confidential relationship among
spouses and blood relatives.”89 “The failure to find a confidential relationship in the
context of the family is not because family relationships lack the characteristics of
dependence and reliance—indeed it is these very characteristics that are the hallmark of
the family relationship.”90 The analysis is often complicated when children or spouses
stand in positions that courts often view as confidential relationships—in particular,
caregivers and power of attorney holders.91 In the spousal context, courts take a variety of
approaches. At least one court explicitly held that the “relationship between a husband
and wife is a confidential relationship.”92 Other courts recognize that result is harsh in
light the evidentiary function of the existence of a confidential relationship. Thus, some
87

See Madoff, supra note ______ at 611.
See Part ____, infra.
89
See Madoff, supra note ______ at 602.
90
See Madoff, supra note ______ at 603.
91
See Part ____, infra.
92
Medlock v. Mitchell, 234 S.W. 3d 901, 905 (Ark. App. 2006).
88
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courts specifically hold that the spousal relationship, although confidential in nature, does
not necessarily carry the same evidentiary presumptions as other confidential
relationships.93 As one court explained: “Although it has been said that a proper
relationship between a husband and wife is often a ‘fiduciary’ or ‘confidential’
relationship, something beyond this normal spousal relationship must exist before a
‘fiduciary’ or ‘confidential’ relationship can be found for the purposes of a claim of
undue influence.”94 Courts are reluctant to find a confidential relationship even where
one spouse is acting as the caregiver for the other spouse, managing his financial affairs,
or involved in the preparation of his testament—all facts which would ordinarily support
a finding of undue influence.95 Parent-child relationships are equally challenging. Courts
are similarly reluctant to find that these relationships are confidential relationships,96 even
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See Estate of Langston v. Williams, 57 So. 3d 618, 622 (Miss. 2011). Accord Jacobs v.
Vaillancourt, 634 So. 2d 667, 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (“The confidential
relaptionship which exists between a husband and wife is not one which may be
considered in the law governing will contests.”); Keasler v. Estate of Keasler, 973 S.E. 2d
213, 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (“[T]he mere fact that one spouse exerices great
influence over the affairs of life as well as home and domestic concerns is insufficient to
raise a presumption of invalidity of the will.”).
94
Ruestman v. Ruestman, 111 S.W. 3d 464, 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). Accord, Estate of
Baumgarten, 363 Ill. Dec. 625, 631 (App. Ct. 2012) (“[T]he law does not and should not
presume…undue influence…because the spouse has been able throughout the marriage to
have considerable influence on her spouse.”).
95
See, e.g., Ruestman v. Ruestman, 111 S.W. 3d 464, 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (finding
no evidence of a confidential relationship between decedent and his wife despite wife
serving as decedent’s primary caretaker); Estate of Mowdy, 973 P. 2d 345, 349 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1998) (finding no undue influence on part of wife who was previously decedent’s
legal secretary where white personally typed decedent’s will).
96
See, e.g., Pyle v. Sayers, 34 S.W. 3d 786, 789 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000) (“The influence of
children over parents is legitimate so long as they do not extend a positive dictation and
control over the mind of the testator.”); Bills v. Lindsay, 909 S.W. 2d 434, 440 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1993) (“A normal relationship between a mentally competent parent and an adult
child is not per se a confidential relationship and it raises no presumption of invalidity of
the transaction.”).
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where a child is serving in a relationship that is ordinarily classified as a confidential or
fiduciary relationship.97

The coveted result/unnatural bequest aspect of the undue influence analysis also tends
to serve a family protection function because it often makes it easier for family members
to prove a case of undue influence perpetrated by a non-relative. Courts presume that
testators will normally leave their property to their spouse and close blood relatives.98
This viewpoint makes it easier for a testator’s family to establish an undue influence case
whenever a testator omits family in favor of a third party. Some courts essentially require
a finding of some “unnatural” disposition in order to establish an undue influence claim.99
“The establishment of the fact that the testament executed would not have been executed
but for such influence is generally predicated upon a consideration of whether the
97

See, e.g., Eddleman v. Estate of Farmer, 740 S.W.2d 141, 140-43 (Ark. 1987) (finding
no undue influence on part of daughter/caretaker of decedent who left his estate to her
and no property to his other daughter); Jacobs v. Vaillancourt, 634 So. 2d 667, 671 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (finding no undue influence on son-in-law who prepared will for
testator which substantially benefitted testator’s daughter and son-in-law’s wife); Carter
v. Carter, 526 So. 2d 141, 143 (Fla. Ct. App. 1988) (describing sons’ role in helping
mother execute a will “the acts of dutiful sons who helped their mother draw up her will
and execute it” rather than “active procurement”); Estate of McCorkle v. Beason, 27
So.3d 1180, 1186 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)(finding no undue influence or confidential
relationship between daughter and testator even though daughter held power of attorney
for father, shared a bank account and safe deposit box with father, discussed will with
father and then typed it for him); Estate of Angle, 777 A. 2d 114, 123 (Pa. Superior Ct.
2001)(“A parent-child relationship does not establish the existence of a confidential
relationship nor does the fact that the proponent has a power of attorney where the
decedent wanted the proponent to act as attorney-in-fact.”); Estate of Jakiella, 510 A. 2d
815, 817 (Pa. Superior Ct. 1986)(holding that neither parent-child relationship nor child’s
appointment of attorney-in-fact for mother required a finding of a confidential
relationship).
98
See Leslie, supra note ___ at 245-46.
99
See, e.g., Baxter v. Grasso, 740 N.E. 2d 1048, 1051 (Mass. Ct. App. 2001)(“It is settled
law that to constitute undue influence, four factors must be satisfied: (1) an unnatural
disposition has been made….)(internal quotations omitted).
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testament executed is unnatural in its terms of disposition of property.”100 In jurisdictions
where a finding of suspicious circumstances is required to support a claim of undue
influence, courts typically consider unnatural dispositions as evidence of suspicious
circumstances.101 Still, other courts consider an unnatural disposition as one of several
factors that can support an undue influence claim.102 The naturalness of a disposition is
typically established if the testator, for no apparent reason, left his property to someone
other than the natural objects of his bounty.103 The testator’s spouse and intestate heirs
are, generally, the persons deemed to be the natural objects of his bounty.104 Regardless
of the stated evidentiary significance in a particular jurisdiction, unnatural dispositions
are often dispositive in undue influence cases. In the course of her study, Professor Leslie
observed that “many of the opinions dealing with contested gifts to non-relatives
concentrated….on whether, in the court’s opinion the gift to a non-relative was
justifiable.”105 She further observed that, “a significant number of courts confronted with
wills that disinherited family members in favor of non-family members upheld or
imposed findings of undue influence based on minimal evidence, or evidence that would
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Estate of Johnson, 340 S.W. 3d 769, 783 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011). Accord Ruestman v.
Ruestman, 111 S.W. 3d 464, 481 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003)(“An important consideration in
determining whether undue influence has occurred is whether the disposition of the
property was ‘unnatural’.”). Accord Rostanzo v. Rostanzo, 900 N.E. 2d 101, 114 (Mass.
Ct. App. 2009)(noting that one of the facts supporting an undue influence claim is an
unnatural disposition).
101
See, e.g., Slusarenko v. Slusarenk, 147 P. 3d 920, 931 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (“The
following factors may constitute suspicious circumstances…(6) an unnatural or unfair
disposition of property.”).
102
See Estate of Graham, 69 S.W. 3d 589, 610 (Tax. Ct. App. 2001).
103
See Ruestman v. Ruestman, 111 S.W. 3d 464, 481 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
104
See Ruestman v. Ruestman, 111 S.W. 3d 464, 481 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
105
Leslie, supra note ___, at 246.
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be insufficient to meet the contestant’s burden of proof in a case where the will’s primary
beneficiaries were non-relatives.”106

C. Charitable Giving
The law of wills also furthers the more general public policy favoring charitable
giving.

1. Identification of Beneficiaries
Generally, a testament must identify the testator’s beneficiaries with reasonable
certainty.107 The testator does not have to use any particular language, however, the
“beneficiary must be capable of identification.”108 “If the writing is so uncertain or
confused or ambiguous that the testator’s intentions cannot be reasonably ascertained, it
is void as a testamentary instrument.”109 This rule is often relaxed in the case of
charitable bequests. Because gifts to charity are favored, “a charitable disposition in a
will must be liberally construed to uphold its validity.”110 Both statutes111 and
jurisprudence recognize “the validity of charitable bequests that do not specify the
charity, or even the general charitable purpose.”112 If the testator sufficiently expresses
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Leslie, supra note ___, at 245.
See e.g. Johnson v. Johnson, 229 S.W. 2d 743, 775 (Ky. Ct. App. 1950)(“The law
permits one to dispose of his property by will, but the intention of the testator must be
expressed with sufficient clarity to enable a court to enforce its provisions.”).
108
Smoot v. McCandless, 461 S.W. 2d 776, 781 (Missouri 1970)
109
Johnson v. Johnson, 229 S.W. 2d 743, 775 (Ky. Ct. App. 1950). Accord Holcomb v.
Newton, 226 S.W. 2d 670 (Tex. Ct. App. 1950); Uloth v. Little, 73 N.E. 2d 459 (Mass.
Sup. Ct. 1947)
110
Estate of Clementi, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 685, 692 (Ct. App. 2008). Accord
111
See e.g. CONN. GEN. STAT. §45a-515; Ga. CODE §53-4-62; LA. CIV. CODE art. 1572
112
Estate of Clementi, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 685, 692 (Ct. App. 2008). Accord Staab’s Estate,
173 N.W. 2d 866, 871 (Iowa 1970) (“Courts generally subscribe to the view that
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his desire that his property be used for charitable purposes, then the bequest will stand
and the executor or trustee may select the particular charities that will receive property.113

2. Capacity to Inherit; Lapse
Courts often refuse to apply the doctrine of lapse to charitable bequests, which
further advances the public policy favoring charitable bequests. A legacy to legatee that
dies or ceases to exist prior to the date of the decedent’s death will lapse.114 When a
legacy lapses it may pass to another legatee under the express terms of the will, to
another person under an anti-lapse statute, or to the decedent’s heirs in intestacy.115
Charitable organizations do not “die” per se, but they do sometimes cease existence. An
existing organization may merge with another organization, may cease operations, or
may fully dissolve prior to the death of the testator.116
When a charitable organization named in a will no longer exists on the date of a
decedent’s death then the doctrine of lapse should apply.117 In practice, however, courts
feel “obliged to ensure that the testator’s charitable intent is enforced” notwithstanding
charitable bequests shall not be permitted to fail or lapse for lack of definiteness as to the
purpose of the bequest.”); Marshal v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 202 S.E. 2d 94, 97 (Ga. 1973)
113
Id.
114
See e.g. Niemann v. Zacharias, 176 N.W. 2d 671, 673-74 (Neb. 1970); Estate of
Micheel, 577 N.W. 2d 407, 409 (Iowa 1998); Estate of Haugen, 794 N.W. 2d 448, 45051 (N.D. 2011)
115
See e.g. Estate of Haugen, 794 N.W. 2d 448, 451 (N.D. 2011); Estate of Harper, 975
A.2d 1155, 1159 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2009); Estate of Hanna, 919 So. 2d 104, 106 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2005)
116
See e.g. Gustafson v. Wesley Foundation, 469 S.E. 2d 160, 162 (Ga. 1996) (charitable
organization transferred all of its assets to another organization); Crisp Area YMCA v.
Nations Bank, N.A., 526 S.E. 2d 63, 66 (Ga. 2000) (charitable organization that was
inactive on the date of decedent’s death allowed to inherit).
117
E.g. In re Brunzel, 51 N.Y. S. 2d 483, 484 (Surr. Ct. 1944); In re Flathers, 288 P. 231,
232 (Wash. 1930)
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the non-existence of the charitable beneficiary.118 If the charitable organization no longer
exists and has no successor organization, courts may invoke the doctrine of cy pres and
distribute the legacy to other charitable organizations with similar purposes.119
3. Conditions
Courts sometimes relieve charitable bequests from the rules governing failure of a
condition. When a testator makes a bequest subject to a condition, the courts will
generally enforce the condition as written. If the condition fails, is not satisfied, or is
impossible the bequest should lapse.120 In the charitable context, however, courts are
more lenient. When a testator gives property to a charity and directs its use for a
particular purpose, courts will often ignore the condition or construe the condition to be
merely precatory in nature.121 In In re Fairchild, for example, the testator made the
following bequest:
I give a one-fiftieth part to each of the seven following named persons and
corporations, absolutely, provided, in each case, that she or it survive me: ...(2)
Hopewell Society, having its place of business at Number 218 Gates Avenue,
Brooklyn, New York (the said fund to be used for the benefit of the Gould Guest
House now situated at Number 27 Monroe Street, Brooklyn, New York).122
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Gustafson v. Wesley Foundation, 469 S.E. 2d 160, 162 (Ga. 1996).
See e.g. Rhode Island Assoc. for Blind v. Nugent, 206 A. 2d 527, 530-31 (R.I. 1965);
Leventhal’s Estate, 212 N.Y. S. 2d 475, 476-77 (Surr. Ct. 1961)
120
See e.g. Hirschberg’s Estate, 112 N.Y. S. 2d 919, 920-21 (1952); Bank One Trust Co.
v. Resident Home Ass’n for Mentally Retarded, 2003 WL 21674987 (Ct. App. Ohio
2003)(slip copy)
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See e.g. U.S. Nat. Bank of Oregon v. Rhilander, 677 P. 2d 745, 745 (Org. Ct. App.
1984); In re Fairchild, 178 N.Y. S. 2d 886, 888-89 (Surr. Ct. 1958).
122
In re Fairchild, 178 N.Y. S. 2d 886, 889(Surr. Ct. 1958).
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Several legatees argued that the legacy lapsed because the Gould Guest House no longer
existed and, therefore, the condition could not be fulfilled.123 The court, however,
reasoned that “[t]he parenthetical words following the absolute legacy are apparently
indicative of the testator’s desire that so long as the Society conducted Gould Guest
House the fund was to be used for that purpose.124 Because the Gould Guest House no
longer existed, the legatee was “free to use the fund in any manner within its general
charitable functions.”125 Similarly, in Rubel v. Friend, the testator made a charitable
bequest in trust and directed that the trustees use his residuary estate to establish and
maintain a convalescent home within ten years of his death.126 The trustees failed to
comply with the terms of the testament within the ten-year time frame.127 The court
determined that the failure of the trustees to meet the condition did not cause the bequest
to lapse because “[e]quity considers the general charitable purpose of the testator or
donor as the substance of the devise or gift.”128 A charitable bequest, in the view of the
court, “will not be permitted to lapse or be defeated by the mere expiration of time or
because there cannot be a literal compliance with its provision.”129 Statutes in a number
of jurisdictions now expressly give courts the authority to distribute property in
accordance with the testator’s general charitable intent while striking problematic
conditions.130
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Id.
Id.
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Id. at 888
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101 N.E. 2d 445, 452 (Ill. App. Ct. 1951)
127
Id.
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Id. at 448.
129
Id. at 449.
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See e.g. DEL. CODE §12:3541; KAN. STAT. §59-22a01; PA. CON. STAT. §20:7740.3;
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III.

EVOLUTION OF CHARITABLE BEQUESTS AND COMPETING PUBLIC
POLICIES

Throughout history, the law of wills has attempted to strike the appropriate balance
between testamentary freedom and family protection. As soon as the law allowed
charitable bequests, that balance was affected. The church—at one time the only sizeable
charitable organization—repeatedly inserted itself in the dying process and the process of
preparing and administering wills. Each time this occurred, the church benefitted
financially at the expense of testamentary freedom, family protection, and the public
image of the church. For centuries, societies have struggled to find the appropriate
balance and have periodically checked the power of the church in the dying and willmaking process. Today, however, the problem is not limited to religious organizations.
Both religious and secular charities are aggressively seeking involvement in the
testamentary process in hopes of financial benefit. History shows us the need for
legislative and judicial response.
A. Evolution of the Competing Policies in Late Antiquity through the Middle Ages

The challenging public policy questions raised by encouraging testamentary
bequests to charity can be traced back to late antiquity. As the U.S. Supreme Court
succinctly explained:
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Charities had their origin in the great command to love they neighbor as thyself.
But when the Emperor Constantine permitted his subjects to bequeath their
property to the church, it was soon abused; so much so, that afterwards, when it
became too common to give land to religious uses, consistently with the free
circulation of property, the supreme authority of every nation in Europe, where
Christianity prevailed, found it necessary to limit such devises by statutes of
mortmain.131

The Court’s summation, of course, oversimplifies matters. Inheritance laws are an
ancient concept. Default schemes of intestacy are found, among other sources, in the
Code of Hammurabi,132 biblical texts,133 and the Aztec society.134 However, the testament
as we think of it today—an instrument allowing a person to direct the distribution of his
property as he sees fit—appears to be a creation of Roman law.135 Under the law of the
Twelve Tables, Roman citizens enjoyed full testamentary freedom in the sense that they
could dispose of the entirety of their estates at death.136 Prior to the Twelve Tables,
property passed from one male to the “next of kin in the male line.”137 The law set forth
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Perin v. Casey, 65 U.S. 465, 498 (1860).
See Robert C. Ellickson & Charles Dia Thorland, Ancient Land Law: Mesopotamia,
Egypt, Israel, 71 CHI. KENT L. REV. 321, 366-67 (1995).
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See generally, Calum Carmichael, Inheritance in Biblical Sources, 20 L. &
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See Francisco Avalos, An Overview of the Legal System of the Aztec Empire, 86 L.
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See EUNICE L. ROSS & THOMAS J. REED, WILL CONTESTS §2:1 (2nd ed.) [Hereinafter
WILL CONTESTS].
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See JOHN GEORGE PHILLIMORE, PRIVATE LAW AMONG THE ROMANS FROM THE
PANDECTS 352 (1863) [Hereinafter PRIVATE LAW AMONG THE ROMANS].
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JOHN GEORGE PHILLIMORE, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY AND HISTORY OF THE
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in the Twelve Tables allowed greater freedom, but it still attempted to strike a balance
between freedom of testation and rules of public order:

The absolute power of bequest, conferred on every citizen by the Twelve Tables,
was a concession to the people. The transfer of property by will at this time being
an event which, in a small state, might materially affect the well being of the
community, was an act of legislation to which publicity was required.138

Roman law was highly formalistic. “The Roman law sought to ascertain, fix and
determine the true declaration of the last will of a testator, by surrounding that declaration
by such safeguards as to forbid the possibility of fraud or the perversion of the testator’s
intention in the solemn act of testamentation.”139 To that end, Roman testaments required
a certain number of competent witnesses—none of whom could be named as an heir or
related to an heir named in the testament.140 In addition to requiring publicity and other
form requirements, the law restricted the persons a testator could name as an heir or
legatee. Importantly, for our purposes, Roman law required that the testator name a
definite and identifiable heir who was a natural person.141 Corporations, societies and
other juridical persons could not be named as heirs or legatees.142 Nor could the testator
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MOSES A. DROPSIE, ROMAN LAW OF TESTAMENTS, CODICILS, AND GIFTS IN THE EVENT
OF DEATH, 2 (1892).
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See DROPSIE, supra note __, at 80-81.
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See DROPSIE, supra note __, at 49.
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See DROPSIE, supra note __, at 49; PRIVATE LAW AMONG THE ROMANS, supra note __,
at 343-44.
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leave his property to “the poor” of for other general pious or charitable causes.143 Policy
concerns eventually resulted in additional restrictions on testamentary freedom that
served a family protection function. For example, testators could only disinherit certain
heirs—“necessarius haeres”—if there was a valid legal cause for disinherison.144

The spread of Christianity forever changed the law. In 313 A.D., Constantine’s
Edict of Milan specifically recognized the right of the church to own property as a
corporation.145 A few years later, Constantine gave Roman citizens the right to leave their
estates to “any of the most sacred and venerable Catholic churches”146 rather than to their
own families. Very few other juridical persons or indefinite heirs could receive
testamentary bequests of property. This practice was soon abused and corrupted.147
Romans would leave all of their property to the church, to the detriment of their children,
other relatives, and creditors.148 The church became an incredibly powerful influence in
the dying process.149 This is not particularly surprising. Fear of death and the desire for
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immortality are universal human characteristics150 and the church offered the promise of
immortality for believers.151

Following the fall of the Western Roman Empire and the resulting political power
vacuum, the church assumed and even greater role in the testamentary process.152
Testamentary bequests to the church became compulsory rather than simply permitted.
The church combined the final confession with the act of directing the distribution of
property at death.153 In the West, the church established its own form for executing a
testament in accordance with Canon law.154 These testaments had to be executed in the
presence of a priest or other religious official—but were otherwise lacking many of the
formalities required by Roman law.155 The church worked to abolish many aspects of the
Roman law aimed at protecting the freedom of the testator—such as the requirement of
disinterested witnesses—in order to enhance the likelihood that the church would benefit
from a will.156 “[M]any councils in France, England, and Spain made it a law for the
laity, that they should not testamentate otherwise than in the presence of their priests.”157
The last testament and the last confession were both part of the same act and that act
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required the presence of a priest.158 Thus, the members of the clergy were the only people
capable of receiving testaments in the first place.159 Naturally, these testaments, often
delivered orally, contained significant bequests to the church. The church, therefore,
offered salvation and immortality, but at a literal monetary price.160 “One needs to go but
little way into the documentary history of the period from the fifth to the fifteenth
centuries of our era, to find abundant examples of the way in which men bought their
peace with Heaven…”161

In 597, Pope Gregory I sent Augustus to England to help spread Christianity.162
Soon, “the clergy had obtained enormous power, and in a great measure controlled the
government, which, from their education and knowledge, they were peculiarly qualified
to administer.”163 The Roman clergy were often the only men qualified to act as lawyers
“and they exercised the profession of religion and law for centuries before these
vocations were severed and performed by different classes of persons.”164 The church
took control of the probate system as well as the execution of testaments.165 Testators
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needed the help of a priest to execute testaments. The church, in turn, was responsible for
interpreting and enforcing the terms of those testaments.166

Feudalism and primogeniture resulted in a division of inheritance systems in
England. Land transferred to the oldest son by operation of law and the church had only a
limited ability to obtain land by testamentary bequest.167 The church, however, controlled
the system governing the transfer of chattels at death. Initially, the church asserted
jurisdiction over wills that left chattels for religious or pious uses.168 Because testators
customarily left a third of their chattels to the church, the church essentially asserted
jurisdiction over all testate estates.169 The church eventually “asserted a right to oversee
the goods of men who died without wills” as well.170 If a man died intestate, then, in the
view of the church he also died without his last confession.171 When this occurred, it fell
to the church to use the chattels of the deceased to do what it could to help his soul.172 By
the thirteenth century, ecclesiastical courts held exclusive jurisdiction over probate and
similar matters.173

Testaments proved to be a lucrative business for the clergy from the fall of the
Western Roman Empire through at least the sixteenth century.174 The clergy “introduced
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the mode of disposing estates after death by testament, and as they were the only persons
capable of drafting such instruments, and as they had the care of the souls of the
testators…generous provisions were made for the church, which became greatly
enriched.”175 Conflict was inevitable.

B. Competing Policies in England

The church acquired massive land holdings in England.176 Although primogeniture
made it difficult for the church to receive land in a testamentary bequest, feudalism
actually provided the church with an even better opportunity to add to its real estate
holdings. “It seems that whenever possible poor freemen preferred to grant their land to
the monasteries for protection rather than to the rich landowners.”177 The church offered
more agreeable terms then other feudal lords.178 “[T]he terms of service exacted of a
vassal by the church were less burdensome and…the monks not only promised him
protection but also assured him that they would intercede for his happiness after
death.”179 The other feudal lords were unhappy with this arrangement. In their view,
excessive property ownership by corporations (and churches in particular) was inherently
problematic because it removed property from the stream of commerce.180 The feudal
175

Id.
HENRY P. TRAWICK, JR., TRARWICK’S REDFEARN WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN
FLORIDA, Appendix A (2012-13 ed.).
177
Id.
178
See A. H. Oosterhoff, The Law of Mortmain: An Historical and Comparative Review,
27 U. TORONTO L.J. 257, 266-69 (1977).
179
TRAWICK, supra note __, at Appendix A.
180
See, e.g., Shirley Norwood Jones, The Demise of Mortmain in the United States, 12
MISS. COLLEGE L. REV. 407, 407-09 (1992); Oosterhoff, supra note __, at 265-69.
176

34

aristocracy worried that inter vivos donations of property to juridical persons allowed
people to avoid their feudal services to the detriment of the feudal lords and the nation as
a whole.181 In response, England enacted a series of “mortmain” (literally “dead hand”)
statutes beginning with the Magna Charta in 1215 in an effort to recalibrate the
competing policy concerns.182 The Magna Charta provided that “no land would thereafter
be alienated except so as to retain the services due to the lord of the fees.”183 Those
restrictions soon proved insufficient and a new statute—the Great Charter of 1217—was
enacted.184 That act was broader in scope than the Magna Charta and provided a
procedural mechanism for enforcement.185 The 1217 act also proved somewhat
ineffective and was followed by the 1279 Statute of Mortmain, which attempted to
expand the scope of the prohibition.186

Initially, family protection was not a major concern because existing laws and
customs protected the family.187 A man’s land devolved to the eldest son by operation of
law under primogeniture, with a life interest, or dower, over a portion of those lands
going to his widow.188 Wills dealt with a testator’s chattels, but often just confirmed the
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default tripartite rule of chattel division.189 If a man had both children and a wife then he
could only dispose of one-third of his chattels by testament.190 The remaining two-thirds
formed the “reserve” or “legitime” belonging to the widow and children. The surviving
widow received one-third, and the remaining one-third was divided between the testator’s
children.191 These rules varied somewhat by region and over time—but their general
thrust remained the same.192 The testator’s wife and children were entitled to a reserve or
legitime that was some fraction of the testator’s estate.193 The testator could direct the
remaining disposable portion of his estate to someone other than his wife and children.194
In practice, however, that disposable portion went to the church either by custom or
ecclesiastical law.195 Testamentary freedom became virtually extinct.196

The early mortmain statutes were simply not aimed at protecting the testator’s
family.197 Rather, the early mortmain statutes sought to strike the proper balance between
the power of the church and the interest of society as a whole.198 The power struggle
between the church and the aristocracy continued over the years.199 In response to the
1279 Statute of Mortmain, the ecclesiastical courts adopted the civil law concept of
189
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“uses” which essentially allowed the church to obtain the enjoyment of even more land
and to circumvent the mortmain statutes.200 In the 1500’s, King Henry VIII actively used
the powers granted to him under the various mortmain statutes to usurp the power of the
Catholic church and its landholdings in England.201 Parliament enacted the Statute of
Uses, which invalidated the concept of uses that the church had used to its advantage in
earlier years.202 Yet, the reign of King Henry VIII and the Reformation actually coincided
with a change in public attitude regarding charitable giving—particularly secular
giving.203 “Several legislative enactments during this time encouraged private
philanthropy, especially in the areas of education and the relief of the poor, sick, and
aged.”204 These two developments were not necessarily inconsistent. The religious houses
had, to some extent, served the poor and needy prior to the Reformation.205 By
encouraging private—but not necessarily religious—philanthropy, the state sought “to
prevent the poor, the aged, and others from becoming a burden on the state.”206 Queen
Elizabeth I continued this trend during her reign.207 The English legal system showed an
increasingly favorable attitude towards charitable secular giving in the following years
and the early mortmain statutes were eventually weakened and repealed.208 Legislation
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enacted in 1703 essentially repealed any remaining mortmain statutes and created a new
and powerful charitable corporation called “Queen Anne’s Bounty.”209 Queen Anne’s
Bounty had a decidedly religious purpose. The queen, who pressured parliament to enact
the legislation, sought to rebuild and strengthen the church in the wake of the
Reformation.210 To that end, Queen Anne’s Bounty earmarked certain tax revenue to be
used to support the clergy of the Church of England.211
England generally moved towards a system allowing greater testamentary
freedom.212 Fraud, however, soon posed a serious threat to that freedom. Prior to
enactment of the Statute of Frauds of 1677, testaments conveying real property only
needed to be written.213 The signature of the testator or witness was not required.214
Testaments conveying only personal property could be oral.215 When the Fire of London
in 1666 destroyed the real estate records and the plague caused an inordinate number of
deaths, this legislative scheme proved disastrous.216 Real estate fraud was rampant.217
Without the signature of the testator or disinterested witnesses, it was virtually impossible
to determine whether a purported testament was the actual will of the testator.218 The
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Statute of Frauds of 1677 largely remedied this problem.219 Under the new law,
testaments conveying real property had to be in writing, signed by the testator, and
attested to before several disinterested witnesses.220 Testaments conveying only personal
property were subject to a less onerous form, but generally required a written
instrument.221
While charitable giving and testamentary freedom gained popular and legal support,
family protection measures lost some ground.222 By the 1700’s England had abandoned
the laws and customs reserving a portion of the testator’s property for his wife and
children.223

It is not entirely clear why England abolished these family protection

mechanisms.224 Certainly, women and children remained dependent on their husbands
and fathers for support and protection. The major continental legal systems all retained
some portion of a testator’s estate for his wife and children—making the English
abandonment of that approach even more unusual.225

The popularity of the church and clergy eventually waned again and England decided
to recalibrate the competing public policies.226 Just a few years after its enactment, Queen
Anne’s Bounty was harshly criticized as upsetting the recently restored balance of power
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between the church and the state.227

In the absence of any limiting statute or custom,

people grew concerned that testators would make improvident charitable bequests from
their deathbeds to the church.228 Amid this renewed anti-clergy sentiment, the English
Parliament enacted the so-called Modern Law of Mortmain in 1736 (the “Mortmain
Act”).229 The Mortmain Act took a different approach from the earlier mortmain statutes
by explicitly prohibiting testamentary bequests of land to charities as well as nullifying
inter vivos transfers of land to charity when made within twelve months of the donor’s
death.230 Any nullified or prohibited transfer simply reverted to the donor’s heirs.231 The
motivations behind the Mortmain Act are somewhat unclear. Some legislative history
suggests that the Mortmain Act was aimed at preventing property from being removed
from commerce.232 The express language of the Mortmain Act explained that its purpose
was to prevent testators from making improvident death bead transfers of property to
charities to the detriment of their own families.233 However, “it is probable that the anticlerical feeling was the most important, though unstated, reason for the act.”234 In any
event, English law sought to find the appropriate balance between freedom of testation,
family protection, and charitable bequests.
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Similar experiences with the church unfolded elsewhere in Western Europe.235 Over
time, however, most countries, including England, repealed their mortmain statutes.236 In
England, repeal occurred first in a piecemeal fashion in the early 1900’s.237 By the
1950’s, when England re-examined its mortmain statutes in a more comprehensive
manner, the mortmain laws had so many exceptions that they mainly served to
complicate law.238 In Parliament’s view, mortmain statutes were no longer needed or well
suited for protecting testamentary freedom and family protection. Rather, by this era “the
influence of the clergy had been greatly undermined” and other existing laws could
protect against overreaching by the church.239

C. Mortmain in the United States

Early American jurisdictions greatly valued testamentary freedom as the
fundamental principle of wills.240 This policy continues today. In recent years, American
courts have described the freedom of testation as a “fundamental concept”241 and a
“specifically expressed constitutional property right.”242 The American colonies did not,
however, import the English mortmain statutes. “[T]he English mortmain statutes were
235
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never thought to be in force in this country unless they had been legislatively adopted.”243
Many American jurisdictions did enact their own mortmain statutes. A few states
apparently shared the traditional concern that excessive property ownership by religious
organizations took property out of commerce. These states enacted laws restricting the
amount of property that a religious group or charity could own.244 The more common
concern, however, was protecting testators and their families from overreaching by
religious groups.245 To that end, some statutes sought to balance the competing interests
of family protection and freedom of testation. As Justice Story explained, the purpose of
these statutes was “to prevent undue influence and imposition upon pious and feeble
minds in their last moments, and to check an unfortunate propensity (which is sometimes
found to exist under a bigoted fanaticism), the desire to acquire fame as religious devotee
and benefactor at the expense of all the natural claims of blood, and parental duty.”246

The American statutes took a variety of approaches. One approach simply invalidated
all testamentary bequests to charity if made within a certain period before death.247
Others placed a limit on the amount of property a testator could leave to a charity in his
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will, particularly if he was survived by a wife or children.248 Some states used a
combination of the two approaches.249 The mortmain statutes eventually proved
unworkable for a variety of reasons. Percentage limitation mortmain statutes posed
valuation problems, particularly when the testator owned property in more than one
state.250 Some statutes were easily circumvented through careful drafting.251 Moreover,
Americans did not necessarily object to all testamentary bequests to charity.252 Indeed,
testamentary freedom remained a valued principle, as did charitable giving.253
Americans were concerned, however, that dependent family members be protected from
disinheritance and that testators be protected from overreaching or undue influence on the
part of charities.254 The problem with the mortmain statutes was that, while aimed at both
of these concerns, they were both over and under-inclusive. The statutes were overinclusive because they voided “many intentional bequests by testators who were not
impermissibly influenced or who [did] not have immediate family members in need of
protection.”255 The statutes were also under-inclusive because they failed to “affect many
charitable gifts made without proper deliberation” nor did they “void legacies to persons
who are in an equal position with religious persons to influence a testator.”256

In

response to mounting dissatisfaction with mortmain statutes, some states repealed their
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statutes voluntarily. In other states, courts held the statutes unconstitutional on a number
of grounds including the equal protection257 and due process clauses of state and federal
constitutions;258 and state constitutional property guarantees.259 A few lower courts held
mortmain statutes unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds,260 but higher courts
generally declined to address that issue.261 By 1975, mortmain statutes remained in only
eleven states.262 In 1998, the last remaining mortmain statute—Georgia’s—was
repealed.263

The mortmain statutes “were repealed because they were unworkable, not because
they were unnecessary.”264 Yet, the mortmain statutes were not replaced with any
particular legislation better tailored to address the problem. Rather, it seems states were
confident that the existing law of undue influence provided adequate safeguards.265 The
doctrine of undue influence had emerged in both England and the United States by the
early 1800’s.266 Initially, the doctrine was rather narrow and required proof of coercion or
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fraud.267 Over time, courts liberalized the doctrine and expanded its scope.268 By the time
states began to abandon their mortmain laws, the law of undue influence was firmly
established and increasingly robust. Many states assumed that the law of undue influence
could sufficiently protect testators and their families. That has not been the case.

IV.

THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR TODAY

“Americans have long been, and continue to be, a famously charitable people.”269
Charity plays an important—but complicated role—in this country. Beginning in the
colonial period, charities provided important services that the government was unable or
unwilling to provide.270 The charitable sector today is a mix of secular and religious
organizations. When considered as a whole, however, the sector does bear some
resemblance in terms of size, power, and benefits to the church of the past.

A. Size and Scope of the Non-Profit Sector
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The vast majority of Americans—anywhere from 64%271 to 95%272--donate money to
charity each year. Since at least 1956, total charitable giving in the United States has been
equal to about 2% of total GDP,273which is significantly higher than giving in any other
country.274 In 2011, private charitable giving totaled an estimated $298.42 billion in the
United States, which was actually a slight decrease from prior years.275

In 2010, there were an estimated 2.3 million nonprofit organizations operating in the
United States.276 These organizations include religious organizations, hospitals,
educational organizations, colleges and universities, and organizations promoting arts,
culture and humanities.277 In 2010, these organizations collectively accounted for 9.2% of
all wages and, salaries paid in the U.S.278 Among those organizations required to file a
financial return with the IRS, nonprofits reported $2.06 trillion in revenues and $4.49
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trillion in assets for the 2010 tax year.279 In 2012, the nonprofit sector share of the
national GDP was 5.5%.280

B. Legal and Economic Benefits Enjoyed by the Non-Profit Sector
Charities enjoy a remarkably privileged position in American law. Legislation
enacted at all levels of government confers considerable benefits on nonprofit
organizations. These benefits often come at the expense of taxpayers.281 Perhaps the bestknown legal and economic benefits afforded to charities are found in the tax arena. At the
federal level, qualifying nonprofit organizations are exempt from the income tax.282
Donors to nonprofit organizations receive their own tax benefits, including income tax
deductions283 and gift and estate tax exemptions.284 Nonprofits with employees receive
additional benefits. In addition to the tax-deferred retirement and pension plans available
to for-profit organizations, nonprofit organizations have more options in the form of
403(b) plans and §457 plans.285 Nonprofits are exempt from federal unemployment
payroll taxes and some religious organizations may opt out of the social security
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system.286 Nonprofit organizations are also exempt from various federal excise taxes and
are entitled to reduced postage rates.287 At the state level, religious and charitable
organizations often receive additional benefits in the form of exemptions from property
taxes and sales and use taxes.288

Tax benefits, however, are not the only legal and economic benefits afforded to
nonprofit organizations by legislation. A number of antitrust laws and regulations that
apply to for-profit organizations do not apply to nonprofits. “Schools, colleges,
universities, public libraries, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated
for profit” are exempt from the Robinson-Patman Act (prohibiting price discrimination)
in some instances.289 Most nonprofits are exempt from the Federal Trade Commission
Act, which prohibits “unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or
deceptive practices in commerce.”290 Nonprofit organizations are entitled to a few, but
significant, exceptions from federal securities laws and copyright laws.291 Nonprofit
organizations cannot be placed in an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding.292 In the labor
and employment context, some nonprofit organizations are exempt from the National
Labor Relations Act and religious organizations are exempt from anti-discrimination and
civil rights laws in some instances.293 Nonprofit organizations are exempt from a variety
of criminal laws including federal conflict of interest crimes under 18 U.S.C. §207,
286
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federal anti-bribery laws, and gambling related criminal law exemptions.294 Many of
these federal benefits have state level equivalents.295

C. Policy Justifications for Legal and Economic Benefits Afforded to Charities

Without question, nonprofits are favored as a matter of public policy. A good deal of
scholarship has considered this public policy in the economic and tax policy context.
Scholars point out that the multitude of tax benefits conferred on nonprofit organizations
and their donors amounts to a subsidy or government expenditure for the benefit of these
organizations.296 Several popular explanations justify the charitable subsidy. The
traditional justification is that “subsidizing charities is ‘good’ because of the benefits they
provide.”297 Specifically, “charities relieve the government of burdens it would otherwise
have to bear, such as poverty relief.”298 Charities “counter[] governmental power and
enhance[] pluralism,” “offer[] alternative viewpoints in arts and culture” and “provide[]
creative and diverse solutions to society’s problems.”299 A newer, and increasingly
popular justification contends that, “subsidizing charities is necessary to help them
provide good or services that would otherwise be under-produced due to various market
and governmental failures.”300 The nonprofit sector—and the subsidies it receives—has
294
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been both applauded and criticized in recent years for a variety of reasons.301 Although
these critiques are obviously important, they fail to consider the wisdom of this public
policy in the context of the individual testator.

D. Non-Profits & Testamentary Bequests
Testamentary bequests play an important role in the financial plans of non-profit
organizations.302 Many nonprofit organizations are looking, in part, to the Baby Boomer
wealth transfer as an important source of funding.303 In their view “[t]he downturn is not
going to keep people from dying, and it is not going to keep a wealth transfer from
occurring.”304 Bequest giving already accounts for an important source of funding in the
non-profit sector. It is estimated that testamentary bequests account for about 8% of total
annual charitable giving.305 In 2011, that 8% amounted approximately $24.41 million.306
301
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At 8%, testamentary bequests represent a small, yet significant, portion of overall
yearly giving. That figure, however, is actually more impressive than it might seem at
first glance. Approximately 2.5 million people died in the U.S. in 2011.307 Of those 2.5
million, approximately 46% died without significant financial assets rendering them
unable to leave a bequest to anyone.308 Presumably then, the $24.41 million in charitable
bequests came in the form of a small number of rather large bequests to charity. Indeed,
there is a significant gap between the number of Americans who donate to charity during
life and the number of Americans who give money at death.309 Although most Americans
donate to charity during life, only 8% of Americans name charities in their estate plans.310
Interestingly, that 8% figure is comparable to findings in the United Kingdom311 and
Australia.312 In the view of charities and planned giving professionals, that 8% figure
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translates into a “giving channel” with “untapped potential” to “yield additional gifts.”313
The nonprofit sector is expending considerable resources studying donors in order to
“add to the body of knowledge about how fund raisers can enhance the number of
bequests given to charitable organizations.”314
1. How Charities Solicit Testamentary and Other Gifts: The Planned Giving
Campaign
The typical planned giving campaign involves three key steps. First, the charity
collects data on its existing inter vivos donors. Second, the charity analyzes that data to
identify the most likely charitable bequest donors—or “prospects.”315 Third, the charity
directs a multifaceted marketing campaign at those donors. Each step in this process is
sophisticated, aggressive, backed in actual research, and largely exempt from legal
regulation.
(a) Data Collection
The first step in any planned giving campaign is to identify potential testamentary
donors. Charities are able to collect, utilize, and share this data on their current donors,
clients, alumni, members, and potential donors with little governmental regulation. The
privacy laws and regulations that protect consumer information in the for-profit context
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do not usually apply to nonprofit organizations.316 Nonprofit fundraisers are free to
engage in practices—like telephone solicitations—that are prohibited in the commercial
context.317 Charities, particularly the large ones, collect all sorts of information about
their donors and potential donors. Once an organization has some very basic information
about a person in their database—like a name and address—they can conduct formal
research—either in house or with the help of a research company—to add to that
information.

Suppose I decide to donate $10 to a charity using the link on its website. In order to
pay by credit card, the charity will require me to provide my full name, billing address,
and phone number.318 Many nonprofits will require additional information such as an email address. Knowing only my name and address, a researcher can discover all sorts of
information about me, often for free. If the charity wanted to determine whether I was a
likely charitable bequest donor, then the charity might want to know my age, marital
status, number and ages of children (if any), education, religious affiliation, income, and
net worth.319 The salaries of state and federal employees are often public information. For
other potential donors, income and net worth may be approximated. Several pieces of
data can indicate wealth: an expensive home, other real estate holdings like vacation
homes, a high paying occupation, owning a luxury car, owning a boat, having an
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expensive hobby, frequent travel, and inherited wealth.320 Knowing just my name and
address, the charity can quickly uncover most of this information. By visiting
anybirthday.com the researcher can input my name, city, and state and determine my age.
The researcher can use my name and address to search the local property records to see if
I own my house, its value, and if I have a mortgage. The property record might also
reveal my marital status. Knowing only my name and address, the researcher can quickly
discover whether I have made any political contributions since 1980.321 If so, the
researcher will also learn the dates, amounts, and recipients of the contribution as well as
my occupation.322

Facebook, Twitter, and other social media sites are a goldmine of information.323
Depending on my privacy settings, the researcher may be able to determine my marital
status, sexual orientation, race, whether I have children, their approximate ages, my
education, employer, hobbies, interests, recent illnesses, recent travel, and a myriad of
additional information. All of the information just described can be obtained for free,
online, with just a few minutes worth of research. Already the researcher has obtained the
data necessary to see whether I meet a number of the demographic markers of a likely
charitable bequest donor.324 Of course, the researcher could do a little more work and
discover even more information about me relevant to charitable bequests. For example,
320
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the researcher may be able to determine my actual salary, my pattern of charitable giving
to other organizations, my social and professional affiliations, and my private business
holdings.

(b) Analyzing the Data
A growing body of research identifies the characteristics of living donors who make
charitable bequests and explains the factors that motivate those bequests. The existing
research is interesting. Most lifetime donors do not leave money to charity at death.325
One study found that 90.6% of donors who gave at least $500 to a charity during life, did
not leave any money to charity at death.326 The decision to donate money during life
apparently involves a different decision-making process than the decision to leave money
at death. A recent functional MRI study revealed that deciding to leave a charitable
bequest involved a different brain region than the decision to donate money or time
during life.327 Researchers are working to identify the differences in that decision making
process in order to convert lifetime donors into bequest donors. Studies consistently show
that family makeup is strongly related to whether a person will leave a charitable bequest.
Testators who are married or who have children or grandchildren are generally less likely
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to make charitable bequests.328 However, parents appear more likely to leave charitable
bequests when their children have higher incomes of their own.329 Although, it appears
that “no other indicator is as strong as childlessness” other demographic factors are
important.330 The likelihood of making a charitable bequest increases with education
level—with graduate degree holders being the most likely to leave a charitable
bequest.331 Being solicited by a charity for a bequest gift is positively associated with
making a bequest gift.332 Other characteristics positively associated with making a
charitable bequest include: volunteering for the charity, attending religious services,
higher socioeconomic status, income, and previous cancer diagnosis.333
(c) Marketing Campaign
Once the nonprofit identifies a pool of likely bequest donor prospects, it will deploy a
multifaceted marketing campaign soliciting a charitable bequest. Marketing can help
create desires that previously did not exist.334 The marketing campaign starts early—
years before research suggests the prospect is likely to actually make the gift.335
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Marketing campaigns often start with a variety of direct mailings, including post cards,
newsletters, annual reports, and magazines.336 The direct mail is sent to a large group of
potential donors with the knowledge that most of them will not actually respond to the
direct mail.337 Rather, the direct mail campaign is intended to influence the prospects so
that “the ground is softer for the next promotion.”338 Post cards have the benefit of being
inexpensive to produce and mail. They also have higher readership rates than other forms
of direct mail.339 Newsletters and magazines will generally include some “compelling
donor stories that tug at the heartstrings of [the] audience.”340

Research suggests that one barrier to charitable bequests is people do not believe they
are wealthy enough to make those gifts.341 To overcome that barrier, newsletters and
magazines will include personalized stories about existing donors that are similarly
situated to the prospect financially.342 The goal of these personal accounts is to “simply
and effectively bring home the message to prospects through sharing living examples of
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people ‘just like them’ who were able to make personally-significant planned gifts.”343
The personal accounts have the added benefit of convincing prospects that bequest giving
is a social norm and is expected of them.344 “Studies show that people help more when
they are exposed to role models who help, presumably because the model provides
information about the social norms for and the consequences of helping.”345 The
marketing campaign will also include events, e-mail, and a website.346 Once the ground is
thoroughly “softened” the nonprofit will follow up with phone calls and personal
visits.347 During the first visit the nonprofit’s representative will simply thank a prospect
for a recent annual gift and try to find out more information about the prospect.348 The
representative will then follow up with the prospect with meetings and phone calls and
will eventually begin to broach the issue of a bequest gift.349

Another perceived barrier to charitable bequests is convincing current inter vivos
donors to execute a will. A number of polls and studies estimate that anywhere from 50%
to 65% of Americans do not have a will.350 Many people delay writing wills because of
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the cost351 and discomfort discussing death.352 Savvy nonprofits overcome this barrier by
offering free estate planning seminars and estate planning services to their donors and
volunteers.353 Consumer research suggests that we are highly motivated when offered
something for free.354 Moreover, nonprofits seek to offer these services at key milestones
when potential donors are most likely to write or re-write a will: “births, marriages,
retirements, [and] family members’ deaths.”355

V.

INADEQUATE RESTRAINTS ON CHARITABLE GIVING AND
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
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The existing rules aimed at ensuring testamentary freedom and family protection are
poorly suited for protecting testators and their families from the overreaching of charities.
The few laws and reported decisions touching on the issue demonstrate a fundamental
misunderstanding of how nonprofits today solicit testamentary bequests. They also
illustrate how this misunderstanding has not only led to an imbalance, but also, to the
potential exploitation of testators and their families by the nonprofit sector. The problem
is evident in several contexts.
A. Interested Parties
The rule prohibiting an interested party from serving as a witness to a will or
participating in its drafting serves an important function. By prohibiting bequests to
witnesses, the rule seeks to “preserve the integrity of the process of will executions by
removing the possibility that attesting witnesses who receive a disposition under the will
might give false testimony in support of the will to protect their legacies.”356 The
requirement seeks “to prevent fraud or undue influence by a witness to a will to thwart
the intention of the [testator].”357 For thousands of years this rule has sought to maintain
the integrity of the testamentary process. In an effort to procure more property for itself,
the church successfully eroded this requirement during the middle ages.358 Abuse was
rampant and the public lost confidence in the church and the sanctity of the testamentary
process. Over time, the law again prohibited interested parties from serving as witnesses
to wills or participating in their drafting. In recent years, however, the strength of this rule
356
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has waned again. The UPC “scrapped the requirement that witnesses be disinterested in
the will.”359 According to the UPC’s official comment, “[t]he requirement of
disinterested witnesses has not succeeded in preventing fraud and undue influence; and in
most cases of undue influence, the influencer is careful not to sign as a witness, but to
procure disinterested witnesses.”360 The comment further explains that, “attorneys will
continue to use disinterested witnesses in the execution of wills.”361 This view, which is
shared by a number of respected scholars, is misplaced. When interested parties are
intimately involved in the testamentary process it casts a cloud over the legitimacy of the
entire process and undermines public confidences. The ability of an heir to bring an
undue influence claim does absolutely nothing to remedy that harm. If anything,
increased litigation over testaments exacerbates that harm. Undue influence claims are
notoriously difficult to prove—particularly where the primary witnesses to the
testamentary process have an incentive to give self-serving testimony. Undue influence
cases are expensive and can rip a family apart in the process. The UPC’s faith that
attorneys will exercise good judgment in selecting witnesses is sadly misplaced.362
Moreover, the UPC seems to presuppose that the influencer has a malicious intent to
defraud the testator and will take steps to cover his tracks. That is not necessarily true—
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particularly in the case of charitable bequests.363 When the representative of a charity
improperly procures a bequest for a charity, does that necessarily make him a bad actor?
More likely, he is either doing his job as part of the organization’s fundraising team or he
is genuinely interested in the success of the charity. Undoubtedly, many, if not most,
members of the clergy in the middle-ages were similarly motivated and they did not
attempt to conceal their involvement in the testamentary process. Their intimate
involvement in the testamentary process, however, harmed testators, harmed testators’
families, harmed the church, and undermined public confidence in the entire process.

Today, the scope of the problem varies by jurisdiction. A number of states continue to
require disinterested witnesses and scriveners. Courts, however, often decline to apply
those laws in the context of charitable bequest.
1. Refusal of Courts to Apply the Existing Disinterested Witness Rule to
Charities

A number of jurisdictions continue to expressly prohibit an interested party from
serving as a witness. These jurisdictions, by statute, impose a variety of penalties—the
thrust of which is to typically deny a bequest made to a witness. In practice, courts tend
to interpret the statutes as requiring a direct pecuniary benefit to the witness.364 Relying
363
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on the direct pecuniary interest requirement, some courts have refused to apply these
statutes in the charitable bequest context. Courts essentially draw a dividing line between
the charitable organization itself and its members and representatives reasoning that a
witness’ membership in the charitable organization does not void a bequest to that charity
“because the member’s interest is too indirect to be a disqualifying interest.”365 In some
cases, this approach makes sense. For example, In re Potter’s Will involved a charitable
bequest to the town of Pawlet for upkeep of roads and bridges.366 All three witnesses to
the will were residents of the town and taxpayers, and, therefore, would all benefit from
the charitable bequest.367 If the court had applied the disinterested witness requirement
strictly, then, presumably, no one in the entire town could serve as a witness—an
obviously absurd result. Rather, the court reasoned that “[n]o one of the witnesses to this
will had a fixed, certain, and vested pecuniary interest in the will, and so no one of them
was incompetent because of that interest.”368

Courts consistently refuse to apply the applicable statute even where the witness’
interest in the charitable bequest is more direct and the witnesses have an obvious interest
in the outcome of the will. Estate of Tkachuk illustrates this point.369 In that case the
decedent wrote a will leaving the bulk of his property to the church.370 At the decedent’s
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request, Reverend Myczka typed the decedent’s will, accompanied the decedent to a
notary’s office, and signed as a witness to the will.371 Reverend Myczka was employed
by the church and served as an officer, treasurer, and member of the executive
committee.372 The decedent’s brother later challenged the bequest to the church under an
existing statute that invalidated bequests to subscribing witnesses.373 The court conceded
that the Reverend Myczka was not an entirely disinterested witness in light of his position
as an officer of the church.374 However, the court upheld the bequest to the church
reasoning that the language of the statute “does not void gifts to a beneficiary where one
of the subscribing witnesses, who is not a beneficiary, is interested in the bequest.”375 The
court construed the language of the applicable statute narrowly and reasoned that the
bequest in question was to the church, not Reverend Myczka.376

Some courts go further and uphold the testament even where the witness does
receive a direct pecuniary benefit. In these cases, the courts reason that the pecuniary
benefit involved is not the type of benefit envisioned by the statute. Estate if Giacomini
illustrates this approach.377 Robert Davis, an attorney prepared the decedent’s will, which
left the bulk of her estate to several charitable beneficiaries.378 Mr. Davis, who was also a
subscribing witness to the will, stood to receive a number of pecuniary benefits. The will
named Mr. Davis as executor, without bond; and gave him the power to employ his own
371
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law firm and to pay the firm without prior court approval.379 Further, Mr. Davis held
positions with two of the charitable beneficiaries—serving as a member of the board of
trustees of one organization, and serving on the fund-raising advisory council of the
other.380 Yet, the court held that Mr. Davis did not stand to benefit from the will and,
therefore, could serve as a witness without any consequences.381 In reaching its
conclusion, the court reasoned that his appointment as executor was not the type of
pecuniary interest that would disqualify him as a witness because it only entitled him to
be compensated for labor he would perform in a fiduciary capacity.382
Courts should construe these statutes more broadly and jurisdictions that have
adopted the UPC approach should reconsider. In a case like that of Reverend Myczka, the
court should not draw a distinction between the charity’s representative and the charity
itself. Because a charity can only act through its representatives, that distinction is
nonsensical. When a charity’s representative is intimately involved in the drafting and
execution of a testament it casts doubt on the integrity of the entire process. Voiding
bequests under such circumstances serves as a meaningful deterrent and can help avoid
the harm associated with subsequent undue influence litigation. The direct pecuniary
interest requirement, as illustrated in Giacomini, should likewise be interpreted more
broadly. The fact that Mr. Davis was an attorney and that his sizeable pecuniary interest
in the estate and its administration required him to perform services does not remove the
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taint of the impropriety of his actions. Indeed, those very facts tend to undermine public
confidence in the legal profession as a whole.383
2. Rules Requiring Disinterested Scrivener Inapplicable

Most jurisdictions have no affirmative law prohibiting a party who prepares a will
from benefitting under its terms. The UPC is silent on the issue and many jurisdictions
simply consider a benefit received by the drafter as a factor in an undue influence
analysis. This presents the exact same set of problems as allowing interested witnesses.
The few states that do address the issue by statute fail to adequately address interested
scriveners in the charitable context. For example, Kansas invalidates any “provision in a
will, written or prepared for another person, that gives the writer or the writer’s or
preparer’s parent, children, issue, sibling, or spouse any devise or bequest…”384 The
statute is simply inapplicable in the charitable context. California goes somewhat further
and invalidates bequests to the party who drafted the will or otherwise has a fiduciary or
business relationship with the testator.385 Although the scope of the California prohibition
is broad, nonprofit organizations are specifically excluded.386 In enacting the statutory
exception benefiting non-profits the legislature acknowledged the need to protect
testators from the undue influence of fiduciaries.387 The legislature decided to exempt
nonprofit organizations from the scope of the prohibition in order to encourage charitable
383
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bequests and “ensure that particular recipients of transfers are not disqualified as
beneficiaries simply because the drafted the language of the transferring instrument.”388
This approach ignores the well-documented history of overreaching by the church in
drafting testamentary instruments.

In most jurisdictions, the only rule discouraging scriveners from preparing
testaments in their own favor are the ethical rules governing the legal profession. While
these professional responsibility rules are well founded, they are wholly insufficient.
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(c) prevents a lawyer from soliciting a bequest
for himself or his family and from preparing an instrument where he receives a
bequest.389 Every jurisdiction has some comparable prohibition. Rule 1.8 is aimed at—
among other things—protecting testators from undue influence.390 The rule does not
adequately protect testators from overreaching.391 In many jurisdictions, the rules of
professional conduct do not have the force of law.392 In those jurisdictions, a violation of
Rule 1.8 will not render a testamentary bequest invalid and may not result in significant
disciplinary action against the attorney.393 Even if a violation of Rule 1.8 does not
invalidate a bequest, most jurisdictions would consider the violation as evidence
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supporting an undue influence claim.394 However, courts resist that approach in the
charitable context and will apply the pecuniary interest analysis to determine that the
attorney did not benefit from the charitable bequest.395 Moreover, the rules of
professional responsibility do not apply to non-lawyers. In a case like Tkachuk where the
party drafting the will is not a lawyer, the drafting party is not bound by the rules of
professional responsibility and cannot be punished for their violation. With the
availability of will drafting software, virtually anyone can draft a valid testament without
the assistance of an attorney.396

B. Refusal of Courts to Apply Undue Influence in the Charitable Context

Undue influence could provide a meaningful remedy from overreaching by charities
and their representatives if courts were willing to apply the law in the charitable context.
Yet, courts consistently refuse to afford facts indicating undue influence appropriate
evidentiary weight when a charity and its representatives are involved. The problem is
evident at nearly every stage of the undue influence analysis.
1. Confidential Relationship

The existence of a confidential relationship is a threshold issue in most undue
influence cases. Courts have repeatedly found reliant-type confidential relationships
394
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where one person relies on another to select an attorney and provide financial
guidance.397 A nonprofit whose representatives provide estate planning and similar
financial services to donors should be held to that same standard.

In furthering their planned giving campaigns, nonprofits routinely solicit their
prospects to execute wills.398 A popular solicitation technique involves explaining the tax
and economic benefits available to charitable bequest donors.399 Indeed, “the
deductibility of charitable bequests enhances the attractiveness of leaving a portion of
one's estate to charity.”400 Many planned giving officers themselves hold advanced
degrees in law and accounting. When the nonprofits are successful it is hardly surprising
that the prospect may ask the nonprofit’s representative to suggest what attorney he
should visit. The representative will gladly do so, taking advantage of the special trust
and confidence the donor has bestowed upon it and will even foot the bill for the expense.
Some nonprofits address attorney recommendation situations proactively by retaining
attorneys ahead of time so that they may offer estate-planning services to their prospects
free of charge. The relationship bears all the hallmarks of a confidential relationship, yet
courts are hesitant to find a confidential relationship in a charitable bequest setting. In the
view of some courts, “[i]t is not improper for charitable organizations to offer estate
planning advice, including plans for charitable donations.”401
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I disagree. History amply illustrates the impropriety of the representatives of a
charitable organization taking over the testamentary process. When the representative of
a charitable organization successfully solicits a testator to write a will naming the
organization as a beneficiary, helps the testator select an attorney, and foots the bill for
the services a confidential relationship exists and the courts should recognize this simple
and obvious fact. The refusal or courts to find a confidential relationship in the charitable
context is especially troubling because the existence of a confidential relationship is a
threshold issue in many jurisdictions. Even in those jurisdictions that do not expressly
require a finding of a confidential relationship, the existence of a confidential relationship
strongly supports a finding of the other required elements of an undue influence claim.
In Campbell, the testator, Mrs. Campbell, developed a close friendship with Mr.
Upchuch, a university’s planning giving officer.402 Mrs. Campbell sought Mr.
Upchurch’s advice on arranging her long-term financial and physical care. After moving
to property adjacent to the university, Mrs. Campbell asked Mr. Upchurch to recommend
an attorney to help prepare her estate planning documents and to make an appointment
for her. Mr. Upchurch not only located an attorney—the university’s general counsel—he
attended the meetings with Ms. Campbell and corresponded with the attorney regarding
Mrs. Campbell’s plans. Mr. Upchurch even arranged for the university to pay the
attorney’s bill. Mrs. Campbell obviously had a relationship of trust and confidence with
Mr. Upchurch. However, the court was unwilling to rule that Mr. Upchurch, and in turn,
the university, had a confidential relationship with Mrs. Campbell at the relevant time.
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Estate of Brevard presents a less sophisticated charity representative than
Campbell, but is equally troubling.403 The testator, Ms. Brevard, allegedly asked Pastor
Barlowe to help her prepare a testament. Pastor Barlowe was friends with Ms. Brevard
and she often attended his church. Pastor Barlowe purchased will drafting software and
prepared Ms. Brevard’s testament for her. The testament named Pastor Barlowe as
executor and his church as contingent beneficiary. Ms. Brevard’s relatives challenged her
will on the grounds of undue influence. On appeal, one issue before the court was
whether Pastor Barlow had a confidential relationship with Ms. Brevard. The court
conceded that had Pastor Barlow been an actual attorney he and Ms. Brevard would have
had a confidential relationship as a matter of law when he prepared her will. However,
the court was unwilling to extend that rule to a person engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law. In the attorney-client context, “heightened scrutiny exists because
attorneys; superior knowledge of the law is assumed to give them an unfair advantage
when conducting business transactions with clients.”404 However, the concern in the case
of Pastor Barlow was different in the view of the court. “The danger inherent in the
unauthorized practice of law is not that the unauthorized practitioner will use superior
legal knowledge to take advantage of a ‘client,’ but that the ‘client’ will be harmed by the
unauthorized practitioner’s lack of knowledge.”405 The court’s analysis completely
misses the point. The appropriate inquiry is whether a confidential relationship exists.
Where a non-attorney seeks to act as an attorney he should be held to the same legal
standard as an attorney.

403

213 S.W. 3d 298 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006)
Id. at 303.
405
Id.
404

71

2. Susceptibility, Opportunity, Disposition, and Coveted Result
In addition to the existence of a confidential relationship, a finding of undue
influence typically requires evidence of susceptibility, opportunity, disposition, and a
coveted result. A successful planned giving campaign bears the hallmarks of each of
these factors but courts often refuse to give this fact sufficient evidentiary weight.
(a) Susceptibility
In determining susceptibility, the court asks whether the testator was susceptible to
the influence of the alleged influencer.406 The testator’s personal qualities are relevant.407
Illness, incapacity, old age, social isolation, declining mental abilities and similar factors
all indicate of susceptibility.408 This vulnerable population is exactly the population
targeted by nonprofit organizations for bequests because they are the most likely to make
those bequests. Planned giving campaigns are actually designed to make potential donors
more susceptible to the suggestions of the nonprofit and its representatives. Direct
mailings and other early contacts with potential donors help cultivate desires and soften
the ground long before the non-profit’s representative ever makes personal contact. Once
a non-profit’s representative actually contacts the testator personally he is more likely to
be receptive to the representative’s suggestions.
Courts, however, are hesitant to recognize this susceptibility to influence in the
charitable context. In Osborn, the decedent left the bulk of her estate to the local Catholic
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Diocese.409 Her sister brought an unsuccessful undue influence challenge. The testator’s
sister alleged, among other things, that the testator was “dependent upon the Clergy as
her means of social outlet.”410 The court saw nothing unusual about the elderly testator’s
relationship with and reliance on the church as her means of social outlet.411
(b) Opportunity
Opportunity is, perhaps, the easiest factor to establish in undue influence cases.
Opportunity simply requires evidence that the alleged influencer had the opportunity to
exercise undue influence. Opportunity generally requires that the alleged influencer spent
a meaningful amount of time alone with the testator.412 A confidential or familial
relationship tends to support a finding of opportunity. Involvement in the preparation of
the testament also suggests opportunity. Some courts are still hesitant to recognize the
existence of opportunity in the charitable context. For example, in Herman v. Kogan the
court found no opportunity overreaching on the part of the attorney or charity where (1)
the charity’s attorney prepared the will; (2) the attorney was also the regional president of
the charity; (3) all of the witnesses to the testament were officers of the charity; (4) the
executors named in the will were officers of the corporation; (5) the will was deposited at
the offices of the corporation; and (6) the attorney apparently did not charge a fee for his
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services.413 Despite this overwhelming evidence, the court found uninformative, largely
irrelevant, and obviously self-serving testimony of the attorney and other officers of the
charity sufficiently compelling to dispel any presumption of overreaching or undue
influence.
(c) Disposition
Disposition requires a finding that the alleged influencer had “a disposition to
influence unduly for the purpose of procuring an improper favor.”414 “Disposition means
something more than a mere desire to obtain a share of another’s estate.”415 Rather,
disposition “implies a willingness to do something wrong or unfair, and grasping or
overreaching characteristics.”416 Courts are hesitant to view the actions of charities and
representatives as rising to this level. In Estate of Davis v. Cook the decedent left her
nearly $2,000,000 residuary estate to Schreiner College, the school attended by her long
deceased son.417 Schreiner’s development officer began to visit Mrs. Davis in 1994. At
the time, she was 98-years old, “lonely, isolated, and plagued with physical
infirmities.”418 Schreiner’s development officer offered estate-planning advice to Mrs.
Davis. Schreiner also “made pleas to [Mrs. Davis] which involved flattery, appeals to
patriotism and self worth, glorification of the memory of her deceased son, and the allure
of membership in the Schreiner Oaks Society, an honorary society for Schreiner
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contributors.”419 The court, however, sustained summary judgment upholding the will
finding that less than “a scintilla of probative evidence” gave rise to a genuine issue of
material fact.420
(d) Coveted Result
The coveted result element asks “whether [the alleged influencer” has, for no
apparent reason, been favored in the will to the exclusion of a natural object of the
testator’s bounty.”421 Courts typically define ‘natural objects of one’s bounty’ based upon
the particular circumstances surrounding a case.422 “[O]rdinarily, all things being equal,
the natural objects of a testator's bounty are those who unless a will exists will inherit his
property.”423 When a testator has no spouse or children, collateral relatives fall squarely
within this description because they are the testator’s likely heirs in intestacy. When
collateral heirs challenge a bequest made to a charity, however, courts are quick to
dismiss the idea that a collateral heir might be the natural object of the testator’s bounty.
In Estate of Davis v. Cook, for example, the decedent left her nearly $2 million residual
estate to charity to the exclusion of collateral relatives.424 In considering the naturalness
of the bequest the court explained that “excluding collateral heirs in favor of charities is
not unnatural.”425 The opinion fails to discuss whether the testator and her collateral
relatives had a close relationship despite the obvious relevance of such an inquiry. In re
419
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Campbell426 is similar. The testator gave the bulk of her estate to a college rather than her
siblings, nieces and nephews.427 The testator had provided for her family under several
prior wills and enjoyed a close relationship with her family.428 Despite those facts, the
court concluded that her relatives were not the “direct sort of natural objects of her
bounty, the testator’s “interest in charity was evident,”429 and the university demonstrated
the transaction was “open, fair, and honest.”430 Some courts go further and expressly
declare charities to be the natural objects of a testator’s bounty. In Estate of Overton, the
court explained that testator’s gratitude to the hospital for the positive outcome from
cataract surgery “made the Minnesota Medical Foundation a natural object of her
bounty.”431
Courts also refuse to recognize the benefits that actually inure to the benefit of the
attorney, executor, or planned giving officer. Burke v. Kehr is typical.432 Mr. Kehr, the
decedent’s attorney, drafted and witnessed her will. The will appointed him as her
independent personal representative and, in that capacity, gave him the authority to
distribute the residue of her estate to whatever charitable organizations he selected. Yet,
the court held that there “was no evidence of the existence of a substantial benefit to
Kehr…”433 In the court’s view, the significant compensation Kehr would receive as
personal representative was immaterial because these were “fees for services.”434 “Such
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earned fees do not constitute the type of substantial economic benefit which gives rise to
a presumption of undue influence.”435

VI.

CONCLUSION

Throughout the history of the law of wills, society struggled to strike the
appropriate balance between freedom of testation, protection of families from
disinheritance and charitable giving. Intertwined in that balance was realization that
religious organizations possessed the ability to frustrate both freedom of testation and
family protection. Restrains on charitable bequests existed in our law for many years.
However, in recent years virtually all restraint is gone. Charitable giving certainly serves
a societal good. However, courts and legislatures should reconsider the deference
afforded charitable bequests in the law order to ensure the appropriate balance is
maintained. Especially in light of a potential “golden age of philanthropy” considered to
be a product of an anticipated generational transfer of wealth, it is particularly important
the safeguards afforded to ensuring testamentary freedom and family security,
particularly by the doctrine of undue influence and the interested witness rule, begin to
shield testators from overreaching charities within the context of charitable testamentary
bequests. The competing public policies ensuring and providing for testamentary
freedom, family protection and charitable giving should begin to operate in a way that
they provide a checks and balances for one another and curb the imbalance toward
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charitable giving which may help to prevent the mass exploitation of this anticipated
generational transfer of wealth by the nonprofit sector.
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